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We study the evolution of cooperation as a birth-death process in spatially extended populations.
The benefit from the altruistic behavior of a cooperator is implemented by decreasing the death
rate of its direct neighbours. The cost of cooperation is the increase of a cooperator’s death rate
proportional to the number of its neighbors. For any benefit-cost ratio above 1, the stable stationary
concentrations of agents pass through four regimes as the baseline death rate p increases: (i) defection
only, (ii) coexistence, (iii) cooperation only, (iv) extinction. We investigate the transitions between
these regimes. Qualitatively identical phase diagrams are obtained for populations on square lattices
and in pair approximation. Spatial correlations with nearest neighbours only are thus sufficient for
sustained cooperation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Altruism or cooperativity [1] describe behavior that is
more in favor of others than of the actor herself. Alarm
calls are an example of altruistic behavior: Increasing
the risk of becoming prey itself first, one individual of a
group warns the others of a predator approaching [2]. At
first glance, the observation of altruism sustained over
generations appears incompatible with Darwin’s theory
of natural selection, featuring the survival of the fittest
[3, 4]. If non-altruists acting only to their own benefit
have an advantage over altruists in terms of reproductive
success, altruistic traits eventually disappear.
The question of sustained altruism and cooperativity
have been addressed in the framework of evolutionary
game theory, in particular by work on the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Public Goods Games [5, 6]. In these and
other games, the time evolution of the system is assumed
to take place as a sequence of two elementary steps: (i)
the combined behavioral choices of the participants lead
to an assignment of a payoff to each player which (ii)
determines the choice of their future strategies or roles.
In the simplest case, with two possible strategies, coop-
eration and defection, the dilemma arises as follows. Re-
gardless of the other agent’s move, an agent’s best (high-
est payoff) move is always defection. On the other hand,
the sum of all players payoffs is maximal when all cooper-
ate. Therefore, natural selection always favors defection
[5], despite cooperation is the best global strategy.
The aforementioned social dilemma is frequently ana-
lyzed by means of the replicator equation [7–9] describ-
ing the time evolution of the fraction of players holding
one of the two strategies. If the fitness of an individ-
ual equals its payoff, the resulting replicator equation
for the Prisoner’s Dilemma has only two steady-state so-
lutions, the only-defector and the only-cooperator solu-
tions, the former being the only stable one. Neverthe-
less, the prevalence of cooperation is still possible within
the context of evolutionary games, provided appropri-
ate reciprocity mechanisms are included in the dynamics
[1, 6, 10–12]: Direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, Kin
selection, group selection, and network structure. If com-
pared to the well-mixed situation, the new mechanisms
include update rules that favor the interactions among
cooperators.
The network structure mechanism was one of the first
reciprocity mechanisms studied in the literature. It refers
to the restriction of agents interactions among neigh-
bours. In a two-dimensional regular network, the sur-
vival of altruists was explained in terms of their ability
of preventing the exploitation of defectors through the
formation of clusters [13–16]. Further progress in the
field considered births and deaths: The second step of
the dynamics, the one that allows a change of the strat-
egy, is now interpreted as a death of a player followed by
a birth. The new ecologic perspective allowed to assess
the importance of new relevant issues, such as the fluc-
tuation of the population density [17–20], the movement
of agents [21–25], the spatial distribution of neighbours
and their number [26, 27], among others. Recent works
also consider networks of interactions [7, 12, 28–32], focus
on the critical properties of the system [33–35], include
other novel dynamic rules [36–42], analyze the formation
of patterns [13, 43–47], and evaluate the effect on the
population growing as external pressure rises [48]. The
latter aspect has been widely analyze in the context of
competing species [49, 50], but has not received much
attention in relation with the prevalence of altruism.
Although general considerations about the prevalence
of altruism in the context of the Public Goods Games
can be inferred from the numerous studies on the topic
[51, 52], the behavior of cooperation turns out to be very
dependent on the specific dynamics considered [53, 54].
This is the case when trying to evaluate the importance
of the spatial heterogeneity and the formation of clus-
ters of cooperators: Many studies [14, 16, 18, 55, 56]
explain the coexistence of cooperation and defection us-
ing the so called pair approximation, an approach that
goes one step beyond mean field by tracking the dynamics
of pairs of neighbours. However, pair approximation still
assumes spatial homogeneity of the system. Hence, there
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2is no need for the formation of clusters of cooperators for
explaining their long-term survival.
Recent works on the evolution of cooperation suggest
the need of giving up on certain common statements of
evolutionary game theory [57–60]. Particularly, some ex-
periments on the dynamics of human cooperation show
that people choose their strategy regardless the payoff of
others [61]. Similar conclusions are given in the context
of living beings [62]. See also recent experimental and
numerical works on related topics [63–66].
Here we propose a birth-death agent-based model
evolving in a structural environment. The model assumes
agents to have fixed strategies, roles, or types (cooperator
or defector), together with a dynamics driven by non-
synchronous birth and death processes, hence allowing
the system to have vacant sites. This approach provides
a natural framework to asses the effects of different mech-
anisms on the behavior of the system and on the survival
of cooperativity, such as the dynamics of interactions, the
fluctuation in the number population, the presence or ab-
sence of cooperation clusters, and the spatial variation of
parameters, among others.
The organization of the work is as follows. In Section
II we introduce the agent-based model of a population
of cooperators and defectors living on a generic network.
For later sections the main focus is on the square lat-
tice, where the system has only three relevant parame-
ters: The total number of sites N , the death parameter
p, and the cost-of-altruism parameter . Section III in-
cludes stochastic simulations. We obtain the phase dia-
gram in the parameter space (p, ) showing the steady-
state configurations of the system. The effect of p being
spatially dependent is also addressed. In section IV the
system is described theoretically. Three complementary
formulations, using main-field or pair-approximation ap-
proaches, are given. They aim at describing the system
under different physical conditions. Finally, a discussion
and outlook of the main results are included in Section
V.
II. DEFINITION OF THE MODEL
The model describes the evolution of a population on
an arbitrary network with N nodes. The set of neigh-
bours of a node i is denoted by Ni. The network is sym-
metric (undirected), so that j ∈ Ni implies i ∈ Nj ; also
i /∈ Ni (no self-loops). Each agent in the population is
either a cooperator C or a defector D, with ci and di be-
ing their respective numbers at node i. A site or node of
the network holds at most one agent (C or D) but it may
also be empty (E), hence 0 ≤ ci + di ≤ 1 and cidi = 0.
Thus the state of the system S is given by
S = {ci, di}Ni=1 ≡ {xi}Ni=1, xi ∈ {ci, di}, (1)
where X is either a cooperator or a defector, and xi its
number at site i. Moreover, the number ei = 1− (ci+di)
gives 1 if site i is empty and 0 if xi = 1. From condition
cidi = 0 we also have eixi = 0.
A state transition is either the birth or the death of
one agent at a site i. At the birth of a cooperator we
set ci = 1 at a previously empty site i. Likewise for
the birth of a defector, di = 1 is set at an empty site
i. These transitions occur at a rate proportional to the
fraction of neighbouring sites occupied by the agent type
to be born, as
pib(ci, S) = ei
∑
j∈Ni
cj/kj ≡ eic˜i, (2)
pib(di, S) = ei
∑
j∈Ni
dj/kj ≡ eid˜i, (3)
where ki = |Ni| is the degree (number of those neigh-
bours) of node i, and x˜i ≡
∑
j∈Ni xj/kj . The death of
an agent is a state transition setting ci = 0 or di = 0 at
a previously occupied site i, with rates
pid(ci, S) =p
[
cie¯i + (1− )cic¯i + (2− )cid¯i
]
=pci
{
1− [c¯i − (1− )(c¯i + d¯i)]} , (4)
pid(di, S) =p
(
die¯i + did¯i
)
=pdi (1− c¯i) , (5)
where now x¯i ≡ k−1i
∑
j∈Ni xj . Agents die at a baseline
rate p. This rate is reduced, however, by the fraction of
adjacent sites occupied by a cooperator. The death rate
of a cooperator, on the other hand, has an additional pos-
itive term proportional (with factor 1− ) to the fraction
of adjacent agents. This way, the parameter  accounts
for the cost of the altruistic act, the limit of  = 0 corre-
sponding to maximum cost where the altruist definitely
loses its life for saving its neighbour’s. The other limit is
costless altruism at  = 1.
In the absence of cooperators, or in the absence of
defectors with  = 0, the model is equivalent to the
SIS (susceptible-infected-suscetible) model of epidemics
[67, 68]. The equivalence is obtained by mapping each
empty site to a susceptible individual and each site with
a defector to an infected individual.
III. SIMULATIONS
Let us first illustrate and numerically analyze the dy-
namics on periodic square lattices. As defined above, the
model features non-ergodicity. Eventually both types of
agents go extinct in a finite size system. In the simu-
lations in this section, a slightly modified version of the
model is employed: We set zero the death rate of an
agent currently being the only one of its type (C or D).
This allows us to take long-term measurements of concen-
trations and distributions without having to restart the
dynamics. Given the rates, simulations are performed
with a standard Gillespie algorithm [69, 70].
3A. Square lattice with homogeneous parameters
Figure 1 shows the parameter dependence of the sta-
tionary mean concentrations of agents. At  = 0, co-
operators are absent in the whole range of p, while the
concentration of defectors is positive for p < pc ≈ 0.62
and vanishes for p > pc. Now fixing 0 <  < 1 and in-
creasing p from 0 to 1, the concentration of defectors 〈d〉
still decreases with p. Before 〈d〉 reaches zero, however,
the concentration of cooperators 〈c〉 becomes positive.
Simulations on square lattices of smaller size (N = 202,
N = 302) and checks with N = 1002 yield results almost
identical to those of Fig. 1.
In the coexistence regime of cooperators and defectors
(green area in Figure 1), the growth of cooperation out-
weighs the decline of defection. Here the total concen-
tration of agents grows with p,
∂(〈c〉+ 〈d〉)
∂p
> 0 . (6)
Figure 2(a) explicitly shows this non-monotonicity by
plotting 〈c〉+ 〈d〉 versus p for different choices of .
Let us now take a closer look at the transitions be-
tween the regimes observed in Figure 1. To this end, we
record the distributions in the number of agents (each
type separately) and consider their changes under pa-
rameter variation. Figure 3 shows this analysis for five
transitions (a)-(e), also marked in the center panel of
Figure 1. Transitions in panels (a) and (e) are both ex-
tinctions of one type of agent in the absence of the other
type. However, the transitions are distinguishable by the
approximate exponents of the algebraic decay of distri-
butions, giving 1/4 for the extinction of defectors versus
3/7 for cooperators.
B. Spatially dependent parameter p
Let us study a variation of the model with a spatial
dependence of the parameter p, a way of mimicking eco-
logical conditions [71, 72]. For an agent at lattice site
(x, y), x, y ∈ {1, . . . , L}, the death rate is based on the
parameter value
p(x) =
{
2x−1
L if x ≤ L/2
2(L−x)+1
L otherwise.
(7)
For L even, the minimum value 1/L is assumed by p(x) at
x = 1 and x = L; its maximum value 1−1/L is obtained
at x = L/2 and x = L/2 + 1. The parameter  remains
spatially homogeneous, here  = 0.75.
Figure 4(a) shows the concentration of agents as a func-
tion of lattice coordinate x, i.e. averaged over lattice co-
ordinate y and time. We see that the effect of parameter
p is local. The p-dependence of 〈c〉 and 〈d〉 observed un-
der spatially homogeneous p in Section III A qualitatively
matches that of the scenario with spatially dependent p.
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FIG. 1: Average densities of agents on a square lattice of
50× 50 sites as a function of parameters p and  (large center
panel). For each combination of parameters, the agents’ con-
centrations 〈c〉 and 〈d〉 are encoded by the color map in the
small lower panel. Red indicates high concentration of coop-
erators; blue indicates high concentration of defectors; green
is for co-existence of the two types, and white for a low overall
concentration of agents. Arrows labeled with letters (a)-(e)
indicate parameter combinations further analyzed in Figure
3. The panels in the top row are snapshots of typical system
states encountered for p ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.7} (panels left to right)
with  = 0.75.
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FIG. 2: Total concentration of agents (a) on square lattices with N = 50 × 50 sites and (b) from the numerical solution of
the pair approximation, Eqs (43)-(47). In both (a) and (b), the three curves are for parameter values  = 0.99, 0.75, 0.10 (top
to bottom). The insets zoom in on the curves for  = 0.10. The inset of (a) does this for different system sizes N = 30 × 30
(dotted), N = 50× 50 (solid), and N = 100× 100 (dashed curve).
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FIG. 3: Distributions of the number of agents on a square lattice with 50× 50 sites. In the lower row, panels (c), (d), and (e),
 = 0.75. Each panel describes a transition between presence and absence of a type of agent. The transitions are also marked
in Fig. 1 with the panel identifiers (a). . . (e).
IV. ANALYTIC APPROXIMATIONS
In this section, we derive three complementary theoret-
ical descriptions of our model, defined in Sec. II. The first
two ones are based on a mean-field approximation, while
the third one uses the pair approximation. As will be
shown, the different approaches have different ranges of
applicability and explain the prevalence/extinction and
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FIG. 4: (a) Stationary mean concentrations for dynamics on
a square lattice where parameter p of the model varies with
the horizontal location x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} according to Eq. (7).
Lattice size is L × L with L = 100. Cooperators’ survival
rate is  = 0.75 constant in space. Showing the concentration
dependence on x, each plotted value is, for a given x, a uniform
average over the y-coordinate of the lattice and over time
t ∈ [0, 106]. (b) Snapshot of a state in the simulation as
described for panel (a).
even the coexistence of altruism and defection under dif-
ferent physical/biological conditions. In the case of the
pair approximation, a very similar phase diagram to the
numerical one shown in Fig. 1 is obtained.
Our starting point is the master equation for the prob-
ability P (S, t) of finding the system in state S at time
t. By means of a probabilistic balance in the continuum
time limit [73], and using the rates given by Eqs. (2)-(5),
the master equation reads
∂tP (S, t) =
N∑
i=1
∑
xi∈{ci,di}
{
(E−xi − 1) [pib(xi, S)P (S, t)]
+(E+xi − 1) [pid(xi, S)P (S, t)]
}
,
(8)
where the operators E±xi act on a generic func-
tion f(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xN ) as E
±
xif(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xN ) =
f(x1, . . . , xi ± 1, . . . , xN ), with xk ∈ {ck, dk}, k =
1, . . . , N .
By taking moments of the master equation (8) we can
derive equations for the mean numbers of cooperators
and defectors in site i, 〈ci〉 and 〈di〉. After using the
relation ei = 1 − ci − di and some manipulations, we
obtain
d
dt
〈ci〉 = 〈pib(ci)− pid(ci)〉
= 〈c˜iei〉 − p [〈cie¯i〉+ (1− ) 〈cic¯i〉
+(2− ) 〈cid¯i〉]
= −p 〈ci〉+ 〈c˜i〉 − [〈cic˜i〉 − p 〈cic¯i〉
+p(1− ) 〈cid¯i〉+ 〈c˜idi〉] , (9)
d
dt
〈di〉 = 〈pib(di)− pid(di)〉
=
〈
d˜iei
〉
− p [〈die¯i〉+ 〈did¯i〉]
= −p 〈di〉+
〈
d˜i
〉
−
[〈
cid˜i
〉
− p 〈c¯idi〉+
〈
did¯i
〉]
, (10)
for i = 1, . . . , N . Since the first moments are coupled to
the second ones through correlations between neighbors,
it is also convenient to derive equations for the two node
correlations for neighboring sites, i.e. 〈xixj〉 with j ∈ Ni:
d
dt
〈cicj〉 = 〈cipib(cj) + pib(ci)cj − cipid(cj)− pid(ci)cj〉
= 〈ciej c˜j〉+ 〈c˜ieicj〉 − p 〈cicj(e¯i + e¯j)〉
−p(1− ) 〈cicj(c¯i + c¯j)〉
−p(2− ) 〈cicj(d¯i + d¯j)〉 , (11)
d
dt
〈cidj〉 = 〈cipib(dj) + pib(ci)dj − cipid(dj)− pid(ci)dj〉
=
〈
ciej d˜j
〉
+ 〈c˜ieidj〉 − p 〈e¯icidj〉
−p 〈cidj(e¯j + d¯j)〉− p(1− ) 〈c¯icidj〉
−p(2− ) 〈d¯icidj〉 , (12)
d
dt
〈didj〉 = 〈dipib(dj) + pib(di)dj − dipid(dj)− pid(di)dj〉
=
〈
diej d˜j
〉
+
〈
d˜ieidj
〉
− p 〈didj(e¯i + e¯j)〉
−p 〈didj(d¯i + d¯j)〉 , (13)
where x˜i and x¯i are defined just after Eqs. (3) and (5),
respectively. The two remaining moments, 〈ciej〉 and
6〈diej〉 can be obtained from the previous ones by means of
the identity 1 = ei+ci+di, as 〈ciej〉 = 〈ci〉−〈cicj〉−〈cidj〉
and 〈diej〉 = 〈di〉 − 〈didj〉 − 〈didj〉.
Although the system of Eqs. (9)-(13) are exact and
valid for any structure of neighbours (network), it is not
closed, due to the presence of three nodes correlations.
Therefore, in order to have a closed set of equations, three
approximations are explored. The first two ones make use
of the mean-field approximation, where two node corre-
lations are ignored, and the third one uses pair approx-
imation. Furthermore, we restrict ourselves to regular
networks where ki = k for all i, so as to simplify the
description (now x˜i = x¯i = k
−1∑
j∈Ni xj).
A. Exact relations
Before proceeding with the approximations, some ex-
act relations will be derived. They apply for homoge-
neous steady-state configurations.
Consider first the case of only defectors. Since 〈c〉 = 0,
we also have 〈cc〉 = 〈cd〉 = 〈ce〉 = 0. Using Eq. (10),
together with 〈de〉 = 〈d〉 − 〈dd〉, we have
〈dd〉 = (1− p) 〈d〉 , (14)
and, with Eq. (13) and the identity 〈dde〉+ 〈ddd〉 = 〈dd〉,
p [1− k(1− p)] 〈d〉+ (k − 1) 〈ded〉 = 0. (15)
which implies, in order to have positive solutions, 1 −
k(1− p) ≤ 0, that is
p ≤ 1− 1
k
. (16)
This is an overestimation of the extinction probability
of defectors, for all  ∈ [0, 1]. For  = 0, where the
model is the SIS model, and the square lattice (k = 4),
the previous estimation is 0.75 while the one from the
simulations is around 0.62 [74, 75], see also Fig. 1.
For the only-cooperator case, it is 〈d〉 = 0 and 〈dd〉 =
〈cd〉 = 〈de〉 = 0. Using Eq. (9) together with 〈ce〉 =
〈c〉 − 〈cc〉, we get
〈cc〉 = 1− p
1− p 〈c〉 , (17)
and, with Eq. (11) and the identity 〈cce〉+ 〈ccc〉 = 〈cc〉,
p
1− p [p(1− )− (k − 1)(1− p)] 〈c〉
+ (k − 1) (〈cec〉+ p 〈ccc〉) = 0,
(18)
which now implies p(1− )− (k − 1)(1− p) ≤ 0 or
p ≤ 1− 1− 
k −  ≥ 1−
1
k
. (19)
Again, this is an overestimation of the critical probability
extinction when there are only cooperators in the system.
The critical value here is bigger or equal to the one of Eq.
(16), as expected due to the altruistic benefit. Equation
(19) also provides an estimation of the dependence of the
critical probability on . In particular, it tends to 1 for
 → 1, in agreement with the numerical simulations of
Fig. 1.
Equations (16) and (19), and also the other relations,
are the same for  = 0 provided we interchange the types
of particles, because the model with only defectors and
only cooperators coincide in this limit. This can be seen
from the rates defining the dynamics in Eqs. (2)-(5):
The rates for defectors in the absence of cooperators are
the same as the rates for cooperators in the absence of
defectors at  = 0.
B. Global mean-field approximation
For the global mean-field case, equivalent to the dy-
namics on a complete graph in the limit of infinite sys-
tem size, correlations among nodes are absent. In gen-
eral, assuming the mean-field approximation implies the
following two approximations:
〈xixj〉 ' 〈xi〉 〈xj〉 , i 6= j (20)
〈xi〉 ' 〈xj〉 ≡ 〈x〉 , for all i. (21)
This is also a good approximation when there is no cor-
relation expected between the agents, for instance when
there is one kind of agent and the distribution of empty
sites is homogeneously distributed. Then, the concen-
trations 〈c〉 and 〈d〉 of cooperators and defectors evolve,
according to Eqs. (9) and (10), as
d
dt
〈c〉 = 〈c〉 {(1− p)− (1− p) 〈c〉
− [1 + p(1− )] 〈d〉} , (22)
d
dt
〈d〉 = 〈d〉 [(1− p)− (1− p) 〈c〉 − 〈d〉] . (23)
The system (22)-(23) can be used now to analyze the
homogeneous steady-state solutions. Requiring station-
arity, ddt 〈c〉 = ddt 〈d〉 = 0, we find the trivial solution〈c〉 = 〈d〉 = 0 (all sites empty) and, two other, nontrivial
ones, namely
〈c〉 = 0 and 〈d〉 = 1− p, (24)
〈c〉 = 1− p
1− p and 〈d〉 = 0. (25)
The trivial solution is clearly unstable, since the coeffi-
cient 1− p of the less degree terms in Eqs. (22) and (23)
is positive for p < 1. However, it is an absorbing state,
and their presence becomes important for small system
sizes, as already mentioned in Sec. III.
In order to asses the stability of the solution with only
defectors, consider the perturbation of Eq. (24): 〈c〉 =
0 + 〈c〉1 and 〈d〉 = 1 − p + 〈d〉1 with 〈c〉1 ∼ 〈d〉1. Then,
7up to linear order in the perturbations, we have
d
dt
〈c〉1 ' −p(1− p)(1− ) 〈c〉1 , (26)
d
dt
〈d〉1 ' −(1− p) [(1− p) 〈c〉1 + 〈d〉1] . (27)
The first equation, and hence the second one, have
〈c〉1 = 〈d〉1 = 0 as the steady solution, revealing the
stable character of (24). Proceeding similarly with the
only-cooperators solution, Eq. (25), we obtain the sys-
tem
d
dt
〈c〉1 ' −
1− p
1− p {(1− p) 〈c〉1 (28)
+ [1 + p(1− )] 〈d〉1} ,
d
dt
〈d〉1 ' p(1− p)
1− 
1− p 〈d〉1 , (29)
which now reveals the unstable character of the solution,
since the solution of Eq. (29) increases exponentially with
time. According to this analysis, in well-mixed popula-
tions, cooperators go extinct.
C. Local mean-field approximation
We can go one step beyond the global mean-field ap-
proximation by considering situations where the concen-
trations of cooperators and defectors change from site to
site. In particular, we suppose situations where the site
dependence can be encoded through a vector r, which
is nothing but the vector of space position in a regular
graph. This way, we deduce in the sequel a macroscopic
description that removes one of the approximation of the
global mean field, namely that of Eq. (21), but still ne-
glects correlations, Eq. (20). The procedure is similar to
the one used in Ref. [76].
By looking at the dynamics on a length scale L much
larger than the typical distance between sites l, the rele-
vant quantities become local concentrations:
κ(r) ≡ 〈ci〉 , (30)
δ(r) ≡ 〈di〉 . (31)
In a regular graph in Rd, for example, κ(r) and δ(r) give
the number of cooperators and defectors inside a region
of volume ld centered at position r. The new quantities
are assumed to be smooth functions of r, a property that
allows us to relate any density of site j ∈ Ni and position
l, say χ(r+ l) = κ(r+ l) or χ(r+ l) = δ(r+ l) at position
r, with that of site i, χ(r), as
χ(r + l) ' χ(r) +∇χ(r) · l + 1
2
∇∇χ(r) : ll, (32)
Hence, we have
〈x¯i〉 = 1
ki
∑
k∈Ni
χ(r + lk) ' χ(r) +∇2rχ(r). (33)
where we have assumed
∑
k∈Ni lk ' 0, which is an exact
expression for a regular square lattice and quiet a good
approximation for isotropic configurations. Moreover,
∇2rχ(r) ≡
1
2ki
∑
k∈Ni
∇∇χ(r) : lklk ' l
2
2d
∇2χ(r), (34)
which is valid, again, under isotropic configurations of
sites.
With approximations (20), (33), and (34), the exact
system (9)-(10) becomes the following reaction-diffusion
system
∂tκ = κ {(1− p)− (1− p)κ− [1 + p(1− )] δ}
+ [1− (1− p)κ− δ]∇2rκ− p(1− )κ∇2rδ, (35)
∂tδ = δ {(1− p)− (1− p)κ− δ}
+ [1− κ− δ]∇2rδ + pδ∇2rκ. (36)
As expected, we recover the mean-field description for
homogeneous solutions, hence we still have the solutions
given in Eqs. (24) and (25). However, an important
benefit of the present description, if compared to that of
the global mean-field approximation, is the possibility of
studying the latter solutions under local perturbations,
in contrast to homogeneous and global ones done in the
previous subsection.
Consider the homogeneous solution of Eq. (24), κ0 = 0
and δ0 = 1 − p. Following the standard linear stability
analysis, we seek solutions of the form κ = κ0 + κ1 and
δ = δ0 + δ1, with κ1 ∼ δ1  δ0. After linearizing and
seeking solutions of the form χ1 = χ˜1e
iξ·r, system (35)
and (36) becomes
∂tκ˜1 = −p
[
(1− p)(1− ) + l
2
2d
ξ2
]
κ˜1, (37)
∂tδ˜1 = −
[
(1− p) + p l
2
2d
ξ2
] [
(1− p)κ˜1 + δ˜1
]
.(38)
The steady state solution for any wavelength ξ is the
trivial one, meaning that the solution of only defectors is
linearly stable: Any initial and small spatial perturbation
in the number of defectors (and also cooperators) tends
to zero as time increases.
Proceeding similarly with the solution of Eq. (25), we
get
∂tκ˜1 = −
[
(1− p)(1− ) + p l
2
2d
ξ2
]
κ˜1,
− 1− p
1− p
[
1 + p(1− )
(
1− l
2
2d
ξ2
)]
δ˜1, (39)
∂tδ˜1 =
p(1− )
1− p
[
(1− p)− l
2
2d
ξ2
]
δ˜1. (40)
In this case, the stability of the system depends on the
value of ξ. Setting ξ = 2pi/L, the smallest allowed value
for the given boundary conditions, the solution (25) is
stable for p < p∗c with
p∗c = 1−
2pi2l2
dL2
' 1− 2pi
2
dN
2
d
, (41)
8where we have used the approximation L/l ' N1/d.
This means that, under this approximation, the only-
cooperators solution is stable for systems small enough.
For N → ∞ it is p∗c → 1, and the solution is always
unstable, and we recover the result of mean field.
Although the local mean-field approximation could in
principle be seen as very rude, it shows the importance of
taking into account the system size while describing al-
truism, as already pointed out in Ref. [60]. In this case,
the inclusion of spatial dependence, while sill neglect-
ing correlations, stabilizes the only-cooperators solution
for p < p˜c. Moreover, the results suggest the existence
of other solutions, spatially non-homogeneous ones, and
the possibility of discontinuous (first-order) transitions
among them. This is because the only-defectors solution
keeps always linearly stable, with no other stable solution
close to it.
D. Pair approximation
The previous mean-field approaches are expected to
fail when the concentration of defectors and cooperators
are locally correlated. Since births occur among neigh-
boring sites, correlations are expected to be important,
in general. Hence, we reconsider system (9)-(13), and
try to express the three nodes moments as a function of
the one and two nodes mean values. Although different
approaches are possible, see for instance [76], we explore
here the so-called pair approximation [77], which can be
translated in this context to
〈xixjxk〉 ' 〈xixj〉 〈xjxk〉〈xj〉 . (42)
Note that the order of appearance of the variables in-
side the brackets is important: xi refers to a node
which is a neighbour of xj and xj is a neighbour of
xk. Observe that the pair approximation keeps the
correlations regardless of the occupancy of the mid-
dle node, namely
∑
xj∈{c,d,e} 〈xixjxk〉 = 〈xi1xk〉 '∑
xj∈{c,d,e}
〈xixj〉〈xjxk〉
〈xj〉 6= 〈xi〉 〈xj〉, in general.
For simplicity, we consider homogeneous situations for
which system (9)-(13), within the pair approximation of
Eq. (42), becomes
d
dt
〈c〉 = (1− p) 〈ce〉 − p(1− ) 〈cc〉
−p(2− ) 〈cd〉 , (43)
d
dt
〈d〉 = (1− p) 〈de〉 − p 〈dd〉 , (44)
k
2
d
dt
〈cc〉 = 〈ce〉 − p(1− ) 〈cc〉
+(k − 1)
{
〈ce〉2
〈e〉 − p
[ 〈cc〉 〈ce〉
〈c〉
+(1− ) 〈cc〉
2
〈c〉 + (2− )
〈cc〉 〈cd〉
〈c〉
]}
,(45)
k
d
dt
〈cd〉 = −p(2− ) 〈cd〉+ (k − 1)
{
2
〈ce〉 〈ed〉
〈e〉
−p
[ 〈ec〉 〈cd〉
〈c〉 +
〈cd〉 〈de〉
〈d〉 +
〈cd〉 〈dd〉
〈d〉
+(1− ) 〈cc〉 〈cd〉〈c〉 + (2− )
〈cd〉2
〈c〉
]}
,(46)
k
2
d
dt
〈dd〉 = 〈de〉 − p 〈dd〉+ (k − 1)
[
〈de〉2
〈e〉
−p
(
〈dd〉 〈de〉
〈d〉 +
〈dd〉2
〈d〉
)]
, (47)
where 〈xy〉 is for any two adjacent nodes with particles
x and y. Hence, 〈xy〉 = 〈yx〉.
1. Steady-state solutions
The system (43)-(47) has several steady-state solu-
tions. The most obvious one it the trivial solution, with-
out particles, 〈c〉 = 〈d〉 = 0. This is the absorbing state
we have already mentioned.
By setting all time derivatives of Eqs. (43)-(47) to
zero and c = 0, we obtain the steady-state solution for
defection only:
〈d〉 = (1− p)k − 1
k − (1 + p) , (48)
valid for
p ≤ 1− 1
k
. (49)
Observe that the previous inequality is the same as the
one in Eq. (16), derived using exact relations. However,
in this case, p = 1 − 1/k is the exact critical value for
the extinction of defectors in the absence of cooperators,
within the pair approximation.
The only-cooperators solution is obtained from Eqs.
(43)-(47) as a steady-state solution with d = 0. Now,
〈c〉 = (1− p)k − (1− p
2)
[k − (1 + p)](1− p) , (50)
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p ≤ k −
√
k2 − 4(k − 1)
2
≥ 1− 1
k
. (51)
The equality of the last relation holds for → 0. For the
other limiting value of , i.e.  → 1, the upper allowed
value of p is 1, as we also obtained exactly.
Other steady-state solutions describing coexistence,
but close to the previous ones, can also be found as fol-
lows. First, we notice that the system (43)-(47), under
the steady-state condition, can be reduced to a nonlinear
system of only two equations with 〈c〉 and 〈d〉 as un-
known quantities. Second, we seek solutions close to the
one-type ones, i.e. 〈c〉 ' 1−k(1−p)−p2(1−k+p)(1−p) and 〈d〉 ' 0 for
the only-cooperators case and 〈c〉 ' 0 and 〈d〉 ' 1−k(1−p)1−k+p
for the only-defectors. For the former case, the resulting
equations are linear and nontrivial solutions appear be-
low the following line:
c(p) =
A(p)B(p)
C(p) +
√
C2(p)−A2(p)B(p) , (52)
with
A(p) = 2p(1− p)(k − 1− kp) (53)
B(p) = (k + 1− (k + 2)p+ 2p2)/[p(1− p)], (54)
C(p) = k(k − 1)− (2k2 − 3k + 2)p
+(k2 − 3k + 1)p2 + (k + 2)p3 − 2p4. (55)
For the only-defectors case, the resulting set of equation
is nonlinear, but one can still find a condition for a non-
trivial solution to exist. Now, the nontrivial solutions are
above d(p), which has the following approximate expres-
sion
d(p) ' E(p)
F (p)
[
1−
√
1− 2G(p)F (p)
E2(p)
]
, (56)
with
E(p) = (k − 1)3 + (k − 1)(4k2 − 7k + 8)p
−{k[5k(k − 5) + 28]− 3}p2
−(13k − 5)kp3, (57)
F (p) = 2p{(k − 1)(2k2 − 3k + 2)
−(2k3 − 14k2 + 14k − 1)p
−(9k − 4)kp2}, (58)
G(p) = (k − 1− kp)[(k − 1)2
+(3k2 − 7k + 10)p+ 2(3k − 1)p2]. (59)
Since c(p) ≥ d(p), the coexistence solutions are in
the region in between the two lines, as shown in Fig. 5
for the square lattice (k = 4).
Finally, there may be other solutions describing coex-
istence not necessarily close to the only-cooperator nor
only-defectors ones. This can be shown explicitly for
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FIG. 5: Phases in pair approximation. The extinction transi-
tion between the regime of only cooperators (red area) to the
empty system (white area) is given by the expression in p and
 in Equation (51). The transition between coexistence (green
area) and the regime of only cooperators is described by Equa-
tion (52) using expressions (53)-(55). The transition between
coexistence and the regime of only defectors (blue area) has
an approximate description (dashed curve) in Equation (56)
using expressions (57)-(59). The exact solution (boundary be-
tween blue and green area) has been obtained as well, details
given elsewhere.
 = 1, for which we can obtain explicit expressions. After
some algebra, we get
〈c〉 = 2(k − 1)(2k − 3)(1− 3p)
(1− p)[4(k − 1)(k − p− 2) + p+ 1] , (60)
〈d〉 = (2k − 3)[(4k − 5)p− 1]
4(k − 1)(k − p− 2) + p+ 1 , (61)
〈cd〉 = 4(k − 1)(k − p− 2) + p+ 1
2(k − 1)(2k − 3) 〈c〉 〈d〉 , (62)
valid for
1
4k − 5 ≤ p ≤
1
3
. (63)
Moreover, it can be seen that this solution is linearly
unstable, with only one unstable mode. However, the
characteristic time of the unstable mode is much slower
than the others, meaning that the system can stay close
to the solution for a long time.
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2. Stability of the steady-state solutions
The stability of the only-defectors and only-
cooperators solutions have been studied by means of a
modified linear stability analysis of system (43)-(47), fol-
lowing several steps. First, using the identities 〈ce〉 =
〈c〉 − 〈cc〉 − 〈cd〉 and 〈de〉 = 〈d〉 − 〈cd〉 − 〈dd〉, all mean
values are expressed in terms of 〈c〉, 〈d〉, 〈cc〉, 〈cd〉, and
〈dd〉. Second, the homogeneous solution is linearly per-
turbed as
u = u0 + γu1, (64)
with u = (〈c〉 , 〈d〉 , 〈cc〉 , 〈cd〉 , 〈dd〉) the vector of the ho-
mogeneous solutions, u0 is the vector of the unperturbed
solutions, u1 is the perturbation vector, and γ a per-
turbative parameter. Third, the proposed solution is re-
placed in (43)-(47) and the resulting system is expanded
up to linear order in γ. Contrary to the usual linear per-
turbation schemes, we obtain a nonlinear closed system of
equations for the unknown perturbation quantities u1,i,
for i = 1, . . . , 5. For both, the only-cooperators and only-
defectors solutions, the equation for the perturbation can
be written as
d
dt
u1 = M(β)u1, (65)
with M being a matrix and β a linear function of
〈cc〉 / 〈c〉, 〈cd〉 / 〈c〉, 〈cd〉 / 〈d〉, and 〈dd〉 / 〈d〉, whose ex-
plicit form depend on the solution considered. In any
case, β is a bounded function, since 0 ≤ 〈xy〉 / 〈x〉 ≤ 1
for x, y ∈ {c, d}. Finally, the asymptotic behavior of
u1(t) for t → ∞, hence the stable/unstable character of
u0, can be determined from the spectra of M(β) for any
β, using the following lemma.
Lemma: If all eigenvalues of M(β) have negative real
parts for all values of β, then u0 is linearly stable.
Proof : Given a time t > 0 and an integer n > 0, we de-
fine ti =
t
M i for i = 0, . . . , n. Thanks to the Mean Value
Theorem, it is u1(ti) =
(
I +M1
t
n
)
u(ti−1) for i ≥ 1,
where Mi is the value of M for a time in (ti−1, ti) and
use has been made of Eq. (65) to evaluate the time
derivative. By iteration, u1(ti) =
[∏i
k=1
(
I +Mk
t
n
)]
u0.
Denoting by ‖·‖ any vector norm, we have ‖u1(t)‖ =
‖[∏nk=1(I +Mk tn )]u0‖ ≤ ‖(I + M˜ tn )nu0‖ where M˜ is
such that ‖(I + M˜ tn )u0‖ = maxk‖
(
I +Mk
t
n
)
u0‖. Tak-
ing n → ∞, ‖u1(t)‖ ≤ ‖eM˜tu0‖ which tends to zero as
t→∞, as all eigenvalues of M˜ have negative real parts.
Using the lemma, we see that the only-cooperators so-
lution is stable above line c(p) given by Eq. (52), and
the only-defectors solution is stable below line d(p) given
approximately by Eq. (56). This implies that the insta-
bility of the one-type solutions is due to the presence
of coexistence solutions which become stable. Numeri-
cal evaluation of the time evolution of system (43)-(47)
confirms the theoretical analysis.
V. DISCUSSION
As the root of the present work, we introduce a ba-
sic stochastic model of a spatially extended population
of altrustic and non-altruistic agents, called cooperators
and defectors. The population evolves by a birth-death
process. In line with the considerations by Huang and
colleages [19], an agents’ interaction with another agent
influences the death rates only. Agents’ interactions are
altruistic acts. They lower the death rate of the recipient
while increasing the death rate of the donor, relative to a
baseline death rate p for agents in isolation, p being one
of two parameters of the model. The benefit-cost ratio
of the altruistic is encoded in the second parameter .
Results are obained as (1) stochastic simulations of
finite systems and (2) stationary solutions and their sta-
bility in approximate descriptions by rate equations. The
pair approximation, neglecting all spatial correlations ex-
cept those of nearest neighbours, yields our main result:
For any benefit-cost ratio above 1, the stable stationary
solutions in dependence of baseline death rate p display
(i) a regime of co-existence of cooperators and defectors
and (ii) a regime of a population of cooperators only. In
the (p, ) parameter plane, these regimes and the related
transitions appear as a continuation of the known extinc-
tion transition for a spatial population without cooper-
ative interaction (also known as contact process, asyn-
chronous SIS model). The latter case corresponds to
benefit-cost ratio of exactly 1 ( = 0).
The phase diagram from pair approximation is fully
qualitatively consistent with that from stochastic simu-
lation with finite square lattices. Simulations of suffi-
ciently large instances of k-regular random graphs yield
an equivalent phase diagram (results not shown here);
this holds also for preliminary simulation results on other
graphs, including scale-free [78] and small-world networks
[79]. Thus we speculate that the observed type of (p, )
phase diagram is generic, holding for most types of con-
nected sparse graphs. For dense graphs, however, we
expect mean-field behaviour without stable cooperation
seen in section IV B.
Consider a spatially extended population subject to a
decline in livability, which in reality may be a reduction of
food resources or an increase of predators. In our model,
this scenario is represented by increasing p and comes
with the following prediction. Initially without coopera-
tors, the concentration of agents decreases until reaching
a transition point with the onset of co-existence. In this
regime, the concentration of defectors further decreases;
this decrease is overcompensated by the increase in co-
operators. Thus in the co-existence regime, there is net
population growth under increasing p [48]. Further in-
crease of p first leads to a regime with a population con-
taining cooperators only and then an extinction phase
where zero population size is the only stable solution.
According to the rule by Ohtsuki and colleagues [51],
cooperation supersedes defection when the benefit-cost
ratio is larger than the agent’s number of neighbours z.
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While their theory assumes a population of constant size
and each agent with a constant number z of neighbours,
we here see cooperation enhanced when the number of
neighbours (occupied adjacent sites) is reduced dynami-
cally due to a shrinking population density. Cooperation
thus appears as a stable solution when the population
most “needs” it, i.e. at low density close to extinction.
Future work may check if a rule relating benefit-cost ra-
tio and neighborhood size characterizes the appearance of
stable cooperation also in the present model with varying
population size.
Giving up the spatial homogeneity of the baseline
death rate p, we have investigated the scenario of a gra-
dient between low p (high livability) and high p (low liv-
ability). The regimes encountered previously by tuning
p for the whole system are now found simultaneously at
their corresponding spatial position. In particular, high
concentration of cooperators is found next to the region
uninhabited due to large death rate p. There is a region
of co-existence where total population concentration in-
creases with p also spatially. Cooperation arises when
and where needed to avoid extinction.
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